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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                     
 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 Jerome J. LaPenna asks us to review a decision of the 
district court, reducing substantial fee awards granted him by 
the bankruptcy court in a protracted Chapter 11 proceeding.  
LaPenna was the beneficiary of more than $600,000 in fees, 
awarded for his services in the three capacities in which he 
acted during the Chapter 11 reorganization of Sound Radio, Inc.  
The district court found that the total amount of the fees was 
unreasonable.  In this appeal, we have had to determine, first of 
all, whether there was any timely appeal of the bankruptcy 
court’s fee awards.  We concluded that one of the appellees did 
file a timely appeal.  This conclusion then permitted us to 
inquire whether the bankruptcy court should have considered as a 
whole the fees awarded to one person, acting in three capacities, 
rather than considering each award separately, and also to 
inquire whether the district court properly reduced LaPenna's 
fees without remanding the case to the bankruptcy court for that 
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court to perform such a review.  Because of the unusual nature of 
the role played by LaPenna, in his performance of three different 
functions in the reorganization, we conclude that his fees should 
be viewed as a whole with a comprehensive evaluation of the 
extent and nature of the various tasks he undertook in his three 
capacities.  We will remand this case to the district court with 
instructions to remand it to the bankruptcy court to make an 
overall determination of the reasonableness of the fees. 
 I.  FACTS 
 On November 30, 1984, Sound Radio, Inc., an AM radio 
station broadcasting under the call letters WNJR, filed its 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.  Twelve years later, the 
bankruptcy court closed the case.  In re Sound Radio, Inc., No. 
84-6261 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 29, 1996).  The proceedings have 
already produced four published opinions and countless 
unpublished rulings.  See In re Sound Radio, 103 B.R. 521 (D.N.J. 
1989) (affirming plan confirmation); In re Sound Radio, 145 B.R. 
193 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992) (considering applications for fees and 
expenses by parties other than LaPenna); In re Sound Radio, 93 
B.R. 849 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (confirming plan of 
reorganization); In re Sound Radio, 59 B.R. 87 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
1986) (refusing to lift stay).  Mindful of this extensive record, 
we will limit our discussion to events linked directly to the 
LaPenna fee dispute. 
 The Sound Radio bankruptcy was filed in 1984.  After 
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bitter infighting among the shareholders, the reorganization plan 
was confirmed on January 5, 1989.   During the same period, the 
shareholder disputes were the subject of litigation in the New 
Jersey courts.  The shareholders continued to cause difficulties 
in the operation of Sound Radio after the plan confirmation.  As 
a consequence, the Official Unsecured Creditors Committee moved 
for the appointment of a trustee.  In October 1989, the 
bankruptcy court agreed to name a trustee to manage the day-to-
day operations of Sound Radio.  Sound Radio appealed this 
decision to the district court, which modified the bankruptcy 
court's order and provided for the appointment of a "Managing 
Agent in lieu of a Trustee."  In re Sound Radio, Inc., No. 84-
6261 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 1989).  The position of Managing Agent was 
created to avoid the impact of 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a), which 
arguably prevents the bankruptcy court from appointing an 
operating trustee after a plan of reorganization has been 
confirmed.2 
 On February 5, 1990, the bankruptcy court appointed 
LaPenna as Managing Agent for Sound Radio.  The appointment was 
made pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 327, which provides for the 
employment of professional persons to represent or assist the 
trustee in carrying out the trustee’s duties.   Two days later, 
                     
      Section 1104(a) provides in its opening sentence: “At any time after the commencement 
of the case but before confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States 
trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment of a trustee-- . . ..”   
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the court approved LaPenna's decision to act as his own counsel, 
naming him Attorney for the Managing Agent.  On September 19, 
1990, the bankruptcy court clarified the powers and authority of 
the Managing Agent, stating that the Managing Agent “has, and 
since his appointment has had, all of the powers and authority of 
a Trustee under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.”   On October 
2, 1992, the court presented LaPenna with a third hat, making him 
Sound Radio's Disbursing Agent.   
 The record  is clear that the bankruptcy court was of 
the opinion that LaPenna performed all of his duties with 
considerable ability.  However, LaPenna also sought substantial 
compensation for his services. 
 During his tenure, LaPenna filed eleven fee 
applications with the bankruptcy court.  Four sought interim fees 
as Attorney for the Managing Agent.  Three sought supplemental 
fees and one sought final fees in the same capacity.  LaPenna 
also filed for interim fees and final fees as Managing Agent, as 
well as for final fees as Disbursing Agent. 
 The dates, substance, and dispositions of the eleven 
fee petitions create a baffling trail of documents and docket 
entries.  LaPenna’s first series of applications for fees were 
filed in his capacity as Attorney for the Managing Agent.  An  
application, requesting $17,050.00 in interim fees, was docketed 
on July 13, 1990.  It was awarded in full on September 27, 1990. 
  The next application, requesting $23,537.50 in fees and $72.25 
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in expenses, was docketed on December 6, 1990.  It was granted in 
full on March 21, 1991.  A third application, requesting 
$27,937.50 in interim fees and $329.08 in expenses, was docketed 
on August 7, 1991.  It was granted in full on October 17, 1991. 
 LaPenna next submitted a series of fee applications as 
both Managing Agent and Attorney for the Managing Agent.  On 
November 20, 1991, LaPenna filed an application for interim 
compensation as Managing Agent, seeking $65,000.00 in fees.  The 
court granted that application in full on December 16, 1991.  On 
January 24, 1992, LaPenna's filed his fourth application for 
interim compensation as Attorney for the Managing Agent, seeking 
$32,242.50 in fees and $845.02 in expenses.  That request was 
granted on March 31, 1992.  On May 28, 1992, LaPenna applied for 
final compensation in his capacity as Managing Agent, and on June 
1, 1992, he applied for final compensation as Attorney for the 
Managing Agent.  The May 28 application sought $205,000.00 in 
compensation in addition to the amounts already granted.  The 
June 1 application sought $75,357.50 in fees and $894.53 in 
expenses, again in addition to what he had already received. 
 Certain of the Sound Radio shareholders objected to the 
May 28 application as “premature.”  On July 1, the bankruptcy 
court granted the May 28 application but held back $30,000 of the 
allowed compensation until the Managing Agent filed his final 
report.3  On July 29, 1992, the court granted the June 1 
                     
      Because non-final allowances of compensation are always subject to the court’s 
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application in full.  Both orders were entitled “Order For Final 
Compensation To Managing Agent.”   No mention was made in either 
order of final compensation to LaPenna in his capacity as 
Attorney for the Managing Agent.  
 This omission was prescient.  Over the next two years, 
LaPenna filed three additional applications for fees as Attorney 
for the Managing Agent.  On December 11, 1992, LaPenna sought 
$92,535.00 in "supplemental fees" and $2,481.55 in expenses.  
After shareholder objection, this application was granted in the 
reduced sum of $82,500 on March 31, 1993.  On April 14, 1993, 
LaPenna sought $55,830.00 in supplemental fees and $1,510.40 in 
expenses.  It was granted on June 9, 1993.  On October 19, 1993, 
in a “third interim supplemental” application, LaPenna sought 
$18,250.00 in fees and $1,264.88 in expenses.  On December 6, 
1993, before the bankruptcy court ruled on the previous fee 
application, LaPenna filed an application for final fees as 
Disbursing Agent, seeking $10,485.12 and $32.80 in expenses.  On 
December 14, 1993, the bankruptcy court granted the October 19 
request.  The December 14 order bears the word "final," written 
                                                                  
reexamination and adjustment at the conclusion of the case, the deferral of the completion of 
payments to the Managing Agent until the filing of his final report would seem to preclude the 
July 1, 1992, order from being regarded as a final, and thus appealable, order.  See Matter of 
Taxman Clothing Co., 49 F.3d 310, 314 (7th Cir. 1995) (“all awards of interim compensation are 
tentative, hence reviewable--and revisable--at the end of the case”); 3 LAWRENCE  P. KING, 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th Ed. Rev. 1996) ¶ 331.04[1] (interim allowances are subject to 
reexamination because all administrative expenses “must receive the court’s final scrutiny and 
approval.”); ¶ 331.041[2] (“a party seeking to challenge an interim award is not entitled to an 
immediate appeal.”)   
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in what appears to be the bankruptcy judge’s handwriting, above  
the title, "Order Granting Allowances."4  On January 19, 1994, 
the bankruptcy court granted the December 6 request for the final 
fees as Disbursing Agent. 
 Prior to the current appeal, Sound Radio’s shareholders 
had made only two challenges to the applications for fees.  The 
first, by a group of shareholders “Shareholders”) represented by 
Harry Heher, Jr., Esq., was to the application of May 28, 1992, 
as being premature.  The second, by Sheridan Broadcasting 
Corporation (“Sheridan”), was based on LaPenna’s failure to have 
lesser paid associates undertake some of his duties as attorney 
for the Managing Agent.   This challenge resulted in the March 
31, 1993, reduction of the allowance of fees from $92,535 to 
$82,500.  
 The appellees are these two groups of Sound Radio’s 
shareholders, Sheridan and Shareholders.  Although the district 
court consolidated their challenges in a single appeal, Sheridan 
and Shareholders have reached this court by very different paths.  
 Shareholders’ appeal began with the bankruptcy court's 
order of December 14, 1993, awarding LaPenna final fees as 
Attorney for the Managing Agent.  Harry Heher filed a Notice of 
Appeal from that order on December 27, 1993.  The district court 
dismissed the appeal as untimely.  In his brief before this 
                     
      As we note above, the October 19, 1992, petition which requested this allowance was an 
application for “interim supplemental” fees and expenses.   
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court, Heher explained the late filing by the fact that LaPenna 
never distributed copies of the order to counsel.  Joel R. 
Glucksman, counsel to Sound Radio's former minority shareholder 
and Board Chairman Daniel E. Robinson, eventually distributed the 
order on December 30, 1993.  It arrived at Heher's office on 
January 5, 1994, nearly two weeks after the time for appeal had 
expired.  Heher, however, had not relied on LaPenna to distribute 
the order.  When no order arrived within a week of its entry, 
Heher visited the Clerk's Office on December 22, 1993, and 
obtained a copy.  He circulated it among his clients, who 
requested an appeal.  Heher promptly prepared a Notice of Appeal, 
intending to file it on the afternoon of Friday, December 24, 
1993.  Because of the Christmas holiday, Heher telephoned the 
Clerk's Office to see if it was open.  He received no answer.  
Heher filed the Notice of Appeal at the start of business on 
Monday morning, December 27.  It bears a time stamp of 9:31 a.m. 
 On January 27, 1994, Heher filed an Amended Notice of 
Appeal on behalf of Shareholders, changing the subject of the 
appeal from the bankruptcy court's December 14 Order to its 
January 19 Order, granting LaPenna fees as Disbursing Agent.  The 
district court treated this filing as a timely Notice of Appeal 
from the January 19 Order. 
 Sheridan followed a different course.  It did not file 
any appeals from “final” fee orders.  However, on May 23, 1994, 
Sheridan filed a pleading styled  
Motion of Sheridan Broadcasting for an Order (I) Determining the 
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Final Allowed Compensation to Managing Agent, Attorney 
for Managing Agent and to Disbursing Agent, (II) 
Directing Mr. LaPenna to Reimburse Debtor's Estate for 
Unreasonable and Excessive Interim Compensation Paid to 
Managing Agent, Attorney for Managing Agent, and 
Disbursing Agent, (III) Providing for Final Accounting 
and Distribution of Debtor's Estate and (IV) 
Discharging Managing Agent, Attorney for Managing 
Agent, and Disbursing Agent. 
The bankruptcy court denied the motion on August 31, 1994.  
Sheridan filed a timely Notice of Appeal. 
 The district court assumed jurisdiction over both 
appeals.  In an opinion filed December 9, 1994, the district 
court explained its assertion of jurisdiction, consolidated the 
cases, and directed the parties to file supplemental briefs on 
the reasonableness of LaPenna's fees.  By Opinion and Order of 
February 10, 1994, the district court reduced those fees by 
$101,195.00.  LaPenna appealed. 
 I.  JURISDICTION AND SCOPE OF REVIEW 
 The bankruptcy court exercised jurisdiction over this 
case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157.  The district court asserted 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  We have 
jurisdiction over the appeal from the district court pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 158(d).  We exercise plenary review over the district 
court's determinations and over the bankruptcy court's 
conclusions of law.  We review the bankruptcy court's findings of 
fact for clear error.  Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman v. Charter 
Technologies, Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1223 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 II.  DISCUSSION 
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 Put simply, this case is a comedy of errors.  The 
parties have repeatedly missed deadlines, misidentified important 
facts, and filed cryptic and unhelpful pleadings.  The bankruptcy 
court struggled to maintain control over this twelve-year fiasco, 
but its orders have not focussed on the overall performance of 
Lapenna in his three capacities.  
 Although we would like to resolve this case cleanly and 
put an end to twelve years of litigation, we cannot so easily cut 
the Gordian knot.  First, we have had to determine whether there 
was a timely appeal to the district court.  Having done so, we 
next considered the manner in which the district court dealt with 
the fee awards.  Like the district court, we are concerned about 
the total amount of fees awarded to LaPenna.  In coming to this 
conclusion,  the district court correctly focussed on the 
requirement that LaPenna’s professional services, in all 
capacities, as a person appointed under § 327, be reasonable 
under § 330:   That they be “reasonable compensation for actual, 
necessary services rendered by such trustee, examiner, 
professional person, or attorney, as the case may be . . . based 
on the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, the 
time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable services 
. . ..” 
 Nevertheless, we believe the district court overstepped 
its bounds by reducing the fee award without a remand to the 
bankruptcy court.  Section 330(a) appears to permit a fee 
  
 
  13 
applicant an opportunity to supplement a questioned application 
and, in the face of an impending reduction by the court, to have 
the opportunity for a hearing.5  See In re Busy Beaver Bldg. 
Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 833, 845 (3d Cir. 1994).  The district court 
reduced LaPenna’s awards without permitting him the opportunity 
for a hearing to oppose the reduction or to establish the 
reasonableness of his compensation.  We will therefore reverse 
the judgment of the district court and remand this case to the 
district court to remand it to the bankruptcy court for a 
detailed examination of LaPenna's fees and an assessment of their 
overall reasonableness. 
 A.  The Timeliness of the Appeals 
 We begin our examination of the merits of this appeal 
with the question whether there was a timely appeal filed by 
either appellant.  We conclude that Shareholders' first appeal 
was untimely but that their second appeal supported appellate 
jurisdiction in the district court.   We reject, however, 
Sheridan's efforts to conjure up a novel mechanism for fee 
review. 
 1.  
 Shareholders filed their first Notice of Appeal on 
December 27, 1993.  This appeal was untimely, an issue of law 
that we have reviewed de novo.  See In re Saunders, 31 F.3d 767, 
                     
     Section 330(a) provides in part:  “[a]fter notice . . . and a hearing . . ., the court may award . . . 
reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services . . ..”   
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767 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 
 Shareholders' December 27 Notice appealed the order 
filed on December 14, 1993.  Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a) states, "The 
notice of appeal shall be filed with the clerk within 10 days of 
the date of the entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed 
from."  Bankr. Rule 8002(a).  This deadline is strictly 
construed.  In re Universal Minerals, Inc., 755 F.2d 309, 311 (3d 
Cir. 1985).  The failure to file a timely notice of appeal 
creates a jurisdictional defect barring appellate review.  Id. at 
312. 
 The shareholders concede the December 24 deadline, 6 
instead arguing that their failure to file was the product of 
excusable neglect.  The term “excusable neglect” appears in 
Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c), which governs extensions of time for the 
notice of appeal deadline.  Rule 8002(c) provides: 
The bankruptcy judge may extend the time for filing the notice of 
appeal by any party for a period not to exceed 20 days 
from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by 
this rule.  A request to extend the time for filing a 
notice of appeal must be made before the time for 
filing a notice of appeal has expired, except that a 
request made no more than 20 days after the expiration 
of the time for filing a notice of appeal may be 
granted upon a showing of excusable neglect . . .. 
Bankr. Rule 8002(c). 
                     
      Had the argument been made, we might have been receptive to a suggestion that an early 
closing of the Clerk's Office on Christmas Eve would constitute "other conditions [making] the 
clerk's office inaccessible."  This would extend the  filing deadline until December 27.  The 
shareholders, however, have not made this argument, nor do we think they have established the 
factual predicate to support it.  Beyond counsel's claim of a single unanswered 
phone call, there is no evidence that the office was in fact closed. 
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 We believe the facts in this case could support a 
finding of excusable neglect for the following reasons:  The 
finality (and hence appealability) of the December 14 order is a 
handwritten addition, no copy of the order was sent to counsel, 
counsel himself contacted the Clerk's Office and obtained a copy, 
and, once the order was obtained by counsel, the Notice of Appeal 
was filed without undue delay.  See Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. 
v. Brunswick Assocs., ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 1496, 1499-
1500 (1993) (characterizing excusable neglect as an elastic 
concept that encompasses inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, 
as well as circumstances beyond a party's control).  Rule 
8002(c), however, requires that even in cases of excusable 
neglect, the issue must be raised and the appeal filed within the 
30-day window of Rule 8002 (Rule 8002(a)’s 10 days for the appeal 
+ 8002(c)’s 20 days for the extension).  See, e.g., Dyotherm 
Corp. v. Turbo Machine Co., 434 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1970; In re 
Botany Indus. Inc., 19 B.R. 599 (Bkrtcy. Pa. 1982).  The rule 
does not allow a party to claim excusable neglect after the 30 
days have expired.  
 Here, Shareholders did not raise excusable neglect in 
connection with an appeal within the time limits of Rule 8002(c). 
 We cannot find excusable neglect when that issue is raised for 
the first time after the expiration of Rule 8002's 30 day period. 
 The December 27 appeal was untimely, and as a consequence we 
lack jurisdiction over it. 
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 1. 
 We reach a different conclusion regarding Shareholder's 
second attempt at appeal.  The Notice filed on January 27, 1994, 
appealed the bankruptcy court's January 19 order.  It was 
therefore filed at the eight-day mark, within Rule 8002(a)'s 
requirements.  Although counsel styled it an "Amended Notice of 
Appeal," this title description is not determinative.  It is 
clear from the language of the notice that Shareholders were 
appealing the January 19 Order.  We hold, therefore, that the 
appeal of the January 19 Order was timely.   
 2. 
 We now turn to Sheridan's appeal.  While Shareholders 
attempted to secure appellate review through traditional methods, 
Sheridan blazed its own procedural trail.  On May 23, 1994, 
Sheridan filed the "Motion for Order Determining the Final 
Allowed Compensation to Managing Agent, Attorney for Managing 
Agent, and Disbursing Agent . . .."  It then appealed the denial 
of that order. 
 Sheridan cited no rule, statute, precedent, or other 
authority supporting the use of such a motion as a vehicle to 
challenge the perviously awarded fees.  The motion seems to have 
appeared out of nowhere with no warning that it was coming and no 
procedural basis upon which to justify its appearance.  
Sheridan's brief on appeal adds nothing to explain the basis for 
the motion.  Sheridan's motion appears to be little more than an 
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attempt to circumvent established procedures of appellate review. 
 Aside from certified interlocutory appeals, an issue 
not raised by this case, the appellate jurisdiction of the 
district court and the court of appeals in bankruptcy matters is 
limited by statute to final decisions, judgments, orders, and 
decrees of the bankruptcy courts.  See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) 
(district court); 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (court of appeals).  Appeals 
from final orders are governed by the time periods of Rule 8002. 
 Our examination of Sheridan’s appeal convinces us that 
it is improper.  On the one hand, if Sheridan's motion sought an 
independent determination on fees from the bankruptcy court, the 
denial of that motion was not a final order appealable under 28 
U.S.C. § 158.  On the other hand, if Sheridan's motion sought to 
challenge earlier orders purporting to be final orders awarding 
fees, then the motion was untimely.  In either case, the district 
court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
 Rather than responding to these problems directly, 
however, Sheridan makes two arguments in favor of its novel 
procedure.  First, it claims that the filing of eleven fee 
applications by one individual wearing three different hats 
prevented any challenge until all fees had been awarded.  Only 
then could Sheridan review the applications, compare them, and 
ensure that LaPenna had not double-billed for the same services 
on multiple applications.  The district court found this argument 
persuasive.  We disagree with the district court’s conclusion, 
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however, because LaPenna had received “final” awards for all his 
services more than ten days prior to the filing of Sheridan’s 
motion.  
 Although we are sympathetic to Sheridan's difficulties-
-the fee applications and allowances in this case will never be 
cited as  models of clarity--we cannot endorse the route that 
Sheridan took.  Sheridan's proper course was to file a notice of 
appeal from any order, denominated a final order, to which 
Sheridan had objections.   Final usually does mean final.  A 
party foregoes such an appeal at its peril.  Far from preventing 
a challenge, the entry of an order, entitled “final,” which 
grants a confusing fee application, should have suggested the 
filing of an appeal. 
 This brings us to Sheridan's second argument.  Sheridan 
claims that none of the orders entered in this case were final 
orders; hence, its method of appeal was not barred.   Sheridan's 
belief, however, that the bankruptcy court's orders were not 
final does not justify its resort to a novel motion.  Certain of 
the orders were labeled final, and Sheridan should have 
challenged those orders as they appeared.  Sheridan's subjective 
belief in the finality of the orders has no bearing on the 
jurisdictional determination. 
 In reaching these conclusions, we have considered the 
practical problems that Sheridan faced.  We believe that Sheridan 
could have addressed these problems by objections to interim 
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allowances and by an appeal of the final award.  Sheridan could 
easily have addressed its concerns about over-billing and double-
billing by objecting to the fee applications that it found 
problematic.  If the bankruptcy court rejected its arguments, 
Sheridan could have filed a timely appeal to the district court 
and ultimately to us.  Sheridan cannot obtain review at its 
leisure by crafting a novel pleading that lacks any basis in law. 
 B.  The Scope of the Appeal 
 Having concluded that Shareholders did file a timely 
appeal of the January 19 Order, we now turn to the question of 
the scope of that appeal.  As we discuss above, LaPenna acted in 
three different capacities during the Sound Radio reorganization: 
 Managing Agent, Attorney to the Managing Agent, and Disbursing 
Agent.  At the time that the fee applications were filed, none of 
the shareholders asked for an overall review of LaPenna’s 
performance of those functions or of the fee awards for them.  
Nor did the bankruptcy court perform such a review sua sponte.  
In January 1993, when the last of the awards was made, we had not 
specifically ruled on the question of whether such an independent 
review by the bankruptcy court was necessary, or even 
permissible.  In March 1994, however, we issued our opinion in In 
re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).  In 
Busy Beaver, we not only clarified the authority of the 
bankruptcy court to review fee requests sua sponte, we went 
further and held that  
the bankruptcy court has a duty to review fee applications, 
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notwithstanding the absence of objections by the . . . 
creditors, or any other interested party, a duty which 
the Code does not expressly lay out but which we 
believe derives from the court’s inherent obligation to 
monitor the debtor’s estate and to serve the public 
interest.  
 
19 F.3d at 841.  In light of such a duty to review, it would have 
been appropriate for the bankruptcy court on its own initiative 
to have examined the fee awards, including whether LaPenna, in 
fulfilling three different functions in the Sound Radio 
reorganization, correctly allocated his different tasks to the  
proper function and whether the fee for each function, as well as 
the total fees awarded, accurately reflected LaPenna’s various 
responsibilities.7  Moreover, in light of our determination, 
since Busy Beaver, that Shareholder’s appeal of the last of the 
orders awarding compensation to LaPenna was a valid appeal, we 
find that it is proper now to direct the bankruptcy court to 
perform a Busy Beaver review of all the interim allowances La 
Penna received in order that the court may evaluate LaPenna’s 
overall performance of his three functions.  In addition, because 
of the interrelationship of the roles LaPenna performed, we 
conclude that a Busy Beaver review of his fees must consider his 
overall performance, its contribution to the resolution in the 
case, and the correct attribution of each role to the fee awarded 
for it.   
                     
      Although we decided Busy Beaver after January 19, 1993, the basis for the duty we 
described in Busy Beaver was extant in 1993.  As we discussed in Busy Beaver, Bankruptcy Rule 
2017(b), 11 U.S.C. § 330(a), and 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) provide “clear and compelling authority for 
the bankruptcy court’s sua sponte review of fee or expense applications.”  19 F.3d at 841.   
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  In coming to a conclusion that a review is needed, we 
note that the record before us reveals at least four orders that 
purport to be final fee awards.  Two of these orders, dated July 
1 and July 29, 1992, claim to award LaPenna final fees in his 
role as Managing Agent.  Although the July 1 order is designated 
“Final’ in its title, a handwritten addition delays completion of 
the payment to the Managing Agent until he has submitted his 
final report.  As Sheridan has complained in its fee motion, as 
of May 20, 1994, a final accounting had not been submitted by 
LaPenna.  In regard to the July 29 order, LaPenna argues on 
appeal that it is actually a final order awarding him final fees 
as Attorney for the Managing Agent.  If so, then it conflicts 
with the December 14, 1993, order that purports to accomplish the 
same thing.  The finality of the December 14 order is itself 
undermined because the word "final" is written in by hand above 
the title.  We thus might have two final orders for LaPenna as 
Managing Agent and two final orders as Attorney for the Managing 
Agent.  We might also have no final orders for LaPenna in either 
capacity.  In addition, as a practical matter, many of the 
allegedly final orders do not appear to be truly final.  For 
example, following the July 29, 1992, "final" order, which 
LaPenna now claims granted him final fees as Attorney for the 
Managing Agent, he continued to perform services and received 
four additional fee awards in that role.  We have difficulty 
viewing an order as final when the subject of that order remains 
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an active participant in a still very active case. 
  Fortunately, we have only one final order for LaPenna 
as Disbursing Agent.  This January 19, 1993, order for the 
Disbursing Agent fee is also the last of the awards made by the 
bankruptcy court, and apparently the last one it intended to 
make.  For that reason, under the facts of this unusual case, we 
have determined it to be the “final” order which permits an 
appeal of the overall compensation allowed to LaPenna in his 
triple capacities.  
 For the above reasons, we find the bankruptcy court's 
approach to the so-called final orders inconsistent with the 
procedures it should have followed prior to entering a truly 
final order.  A given fee application must be examined not only 
on its own terms but also in light of prior awards.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 330(a)(5) ("[t]he court shall reduce the amount of 
compensation awarded . . . by the amount of any interim 
compensation awarded under section 331, and, if the amount of 
such interim compensation exceeds the amount of compensation 
awarded under this section, may order the return of the excess to 
the estate"); see also In re Leedy Mortgage Co., 126 B.R. 907 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (examining total fee at conclusion of 
case; revisiting interim awards); cf. In re Public Service Co., 
138 B.R. 660 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1992) (explaining that interim fees 
are an allowance to be credited as part of final fee award for 
entire case).  Moreover, when a professional agent or attorney is 
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performing multiple functions, it may be advisable to examine 
each of the fees awarded to such an applicant to ensure that they 
are properly attributed to the appropriate function.  Before 
awarding a final fee, the bankruptcy court should evaluate the 
services performed by the professional in toto to make an overall 
determination of the awards which are merited by the entire 
course of services.  No such calculation took place in this case.  
 An additional concern that we have with the total 
amount of the fee awards arises from the fact that LaPenna was in 
effect a trustee, albeit he was titled Managing Agent.  LaPenna 
appears to concede that his fees as Managing Agent should be 
computed according to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 326 which 
sets limitations on the compensation of trustees.  His November 
19, 1991, and the May 27, 1992, applications for compensation for 
the Managing Agent were based on the trustee’s commissions set 
forth in § 326(a).  There is disagreement among the parties, 
however, as to whether the $8,100,000 basis upon which these 
commissions were computed was the appropriate figure.  This 
element of the basis for the Managing Agent fee would also be 
appropriate to consider in a review of the fees.    
 Because of these problems, we have doubts regarding 
LaPenna's overall fee award.  The district court shared our 
concern, and it took steps to review and reduce the fee.  While 
we agree with the district court's assessment of the case, we 
cannot agree with the procedure it followed.  The district court 
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reviews the proceedings of the bankruptcy court in an appellate 
capacity.  A Busy Beaver fee examination, which may entail the 
taking of evidence, including testimony and fact-finding by the 
court, is inappropriate for an appellate tribunal.  Nor can such 
a fee dispute be resolved on the briefs.  Once the district court 
found the bankruptcy court's treatment of the fee issue 
inadequate, its proper course was to remand the case to the 
bankruptcy court with instructions to perform a Busy Beaver 
evaluation.  Because the district court relied on supplemental 
briefing to reach an independent determination on the 
reasonableness of LaPenna's fees, we will vacate its judgment.  
 I.  CONCLUSION 
 We will remand this case to the district court with 
instructions to remand it to the bankruptcy court to undertake a 
Busy Beaver evaluation of the propriety of LaPenna's total fee 
award.  In making this calculation, the bankruptcy court must 
consider all fees awarded to LaPenna in each of his three 
capacities.  The bankruptcy court should then enter a final award 
that delineates LaPenna's appropriate compensation in his various 
capacities based on his performance throughout the case. 
 
 
 
  
 
